

הוי' לי בעוזרי

תשי"ז

Havayah Li B'Ozroy

5717

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
About Simply Chassidus

Simply Chassidus releases one *ma'amar* of the Rebbe each month with English translation and commentary. Each *ma'amar* is divided into three sections, each of which can be learned in approximately one hour. By learning one section per week, usually on Shabbos morning, participants can finish one *ma'amar* per month, with time to review the *ma'amar* on Shabbos Mevarchim.

Simply Chassidus is translated by Simcha Kanter and is a project of Congregation Bnei Ruven in Chicago under the direction of Rabbi Boruch Hertz. Simply Chassidus is written in the *zechus* of *refuah shleima* for גיטל בת סימא.

Reviewed with Rabbi Fischel Oster in the *zechus* of *refuah shleima* for ארי' יהודה בן שרה רבקה.

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Section One

This *ma'amar*, which the Rebbe said on Yud Bais Tammuz in 5717 (1957), is based on a *ma'amar* of the Frierdiker Rebbe which the Frierdiker Rebbe said upon being released from exile in 5687 (1927).

The *ma'amar* is based on the following *possuk* from Tehillim (118:7):

Havayah is for me with my helpers, and I shall see [revenge] in my enemies. יְיָ לִי בְעֹזְרֵי וְאֲנִי אֶרְאֶה בְּשׂוֹנְאָי׃

הוי' לי בעוזרי ואני אראה בשונאי, ומדייק כ"ק מו"ח אדמו"ר בעל השמחה והגאולה במאמרו ד"ה זה (שאמרו בי"ב תמוז הראשון, תרפ"ז)², דמשמעות הלשון הוי' לי בעוזרי הוא שישנם עוזרים אחרים, והבקשה היא שגם הקב"ה יהי בין העוזרים, ואינו מובן³, הרי כל ישראל מאמינים באמונה פשוטה שהוא ית' לבדו הוא העוזר והמושיע להאדם בכל ענינו, והיאך אומר הוי' לי בעוזרי, דמשמעות הלשון הוא שישנם עוזרים אחרים, שהם העוזרים האמיתים, והקב"ה מצטרף עמהם.

In the Frierdiker Rebbe's *ma'amar*, the Frierdiker Rebbe points out that the phrase "*Havayah* is for me with my helpers" implies that Dovid HaMelech has **many** helpers, and he is asking Hashem to **also** be one of his helpers. Furthermore, it implies that Dovid's other helpers are his "true helpers," and Hashem only "joins" them to provide **additional** assistance. However, this seems to contradict the basic faith of every Jew that Hashem is the **single** source of help and assistance for all of a person's needs.

Question One:

Why does Dovid HaMelech imply that Hashem is "**one** of his helpers" if a cornerstone of Jewish faith is that Hashem is the **only** one that we rely on?

וגם צ"ל מהו הבקשה ואני אראה בשונאי (שיראה נקמה בשונאיו),
דלכאורה הוי לי לבקש שהאויבים והשונאים יהפכו לאוהבים.

Question Two:

Why does Dovid HaMelech request that he should see the **revenge** that will be taken on his enemies? Shouldn't he ask Hashem to transform his enemies into friends instead?

However, in this situation it seems that revenge could be justifiable:

והגם דשנאתו של דוד היתה רק לשונאי הוי' כמ"ש⁴ הלא משנאיך
הוי' אשנא ובתקוממיך אתקוטט,

The only people who Dovid HaMelech hated (his enemies) were "enemies" of Hashem, as Dovid himself said, "Did I not hate Your enemies, Hashem? With those who rise up against You, I fight." Therefore, if Dovid's enemies are enemies of Hashem, we could say that it is justifiable to desire revenge against them.

However, Dovid should have desired their transformation (*teshuvah*) and not their revenge:

מ"מ, הרי כתיב⁵ יתמו חטאים ולא חוטאים [דענין זה הוא גם בשונאי
הוי', וכמו שראינו בהנהגת רבותינו נשיאינו, ובמיוחד בבעל הגאולה,
שקירבו גם את אלו שנכללים בהסוג המדובר בתניא פרק לב בסופו,
והחזירו אותם למוטב⁶], והוה לי לבקש שיעשו תשובה, ומהי
הבקשה ואני אראה בשונאי.

Earlier in Tehillim, Dovid HaMelech said, "Let sins cease from the earth and the wicked will be no more." As the Gemara in Brachos explains, this means that the **sins themselves** should cease to exist, and then the wicked will no longer be wicked. We see from here that Dovid didn't desire revenge against his enemies – even the "enemies of Hashem" – he just wanted them to do *teshuvah*.

Furthermore, the Rebbe points out that we see that the Rabbeim – especially the Friediker Rebbe – even reached out to those who could be considered “enemies of Hashem” and helped them do *teshuva*.

We therefore return to our original question: If Dovid HaMelech didn't desire revenge against his (and Hashem's) enemies, what is the meaning of the statement “and I shall see [revenge] in my enemies”?

In order to answer these questions, the Rebbe first analyzes the *ma'amar* of the Friediker Rebbe in more detail:

וּלְהַבִּין (ב) זה מקדים בהמאמר⁷ מה שאמר דוד⁸ זמירות היו לי חוקיך בבית מגורי, שבעת היותו נע ונד מטולטל בגירות (מגורי מלשון גירות⁹) ומלא פחדים (מגורי מלשון מגור ופחד¹⁰) משונאיו ומרודפיו, ה' מתענג ושמח בדברי תורה (חוקיך), שהיו ערבים ומתוקים לו כמו זמירות וניגונים.

In Tehillim, Dovid HaMelech says:

זְמִירוֹת הָיוּ לִי חֻקֶיךָ בְּבַיִת
 in the house of *meguroy* [foreign places].
 מְגוּרוֹי:

The word *meguroy* can be interpreted as being related to the word *geirus* (dwelling in a foreign place), and can also be interpreted as being related to the word *magur* (fear).

Putting these two interpretations together, Dovid HaMelech is saying that when he wandered about in **foreign places** and was filled with **fear** of his enemies, he had tremendous pleasure and joy from the words of Torah (Your *chukim*), which were as sweet to him as beautiful songs and melodies.

וצריך להבין, הרי יש ריבוי מיני תענוגים, ומדוע מדמה דוד התענוג שה' לו בדברי תורה להתענוג שבזמירות דוקא.

Question Three:

There are many different types of pleasure (from beautiful sights, smells, sounds, etc.) that a person can experience. Why did Dovid specifically compare the pleasure that he has from Torah to the pleasure one gets from hearing beautiful music?

The Rebbe also analyzes why Dovid HaMelech specifically chose to refer to the Torah as "*chukim*" even though the category of *chukim* is only one of the three categories of mitzvos:

וגם צריך להבין, הרי במצוות יש ג' סוגים, משפטים עדות וחוקים¹¹,

As the *ma'amar* will now explain, there are three categories of mitzvos: *mishpatim*, *eidus*, and *chukim*.

משפטים הם המצוות שמחוייבים גם מצד השכל (כמו גזל גניבה אונאה כיבוד אב ואם). עדות הם המצוות שהם אות וזכרון (כמו שבת פסח סוכה ותפילין), דגם מצוות אלו יש להם מקום בשכל.

Mishpatim refer to rational mitzvos such as the prohibitions against theft and deception, or the mitzvah to honor your parents. Even if the Torah hadn't commanded us to do these things, we would logically realize that they are necessary laws for a civilized society.

Eidus refer to symbolic mitzvos which commemorate an idea or event. Mitzvos in this category include Shabbos (remembering the seventh day when Hashem "rested" from the work of creation), Pesach (eating matzah, etc. to remember how Hashem took us out of Mitzrayim), sitting in a Sukkah (to remember the Clouds of Glory which protected us in the desert), and putting on *tefillin* (which reminds us to be aware of the unity of Hashem in our minds and hearts). These mitzvos are similar to *mishpatim* because they are compatible with human logic.

However, there is a difference between *eidus* and *mishpatim*:

דהגם שהשכל מצד עצמו (לולי ציווי התורה) לא הי' מחייבם [ודלא כהמצוות דמשפטים שגם אלמלא ניתנה תורה היינו למידין צניעות מחתול וגזל מנמלה¹²], מ"מ, לאחרי שהתורה ציוותה עליהם, גם השכל מסכים לזה.

If the Torah hadn't been given, we would have come to the conclusion **on our own** that we should follow the mitzvos in the category of *mishpatim*. As the Gemara says, "we would have learned modesty from a cat and [the prohibition against] stealing from an ant." *Eidus*, on the other hand, make sense **after** Hashem commanded us to do them, but we wouldn't have decided on our own that they need to be done (at least not in the same way that Hashem commanded us to).

Despite their differences, *mishpatim* and *eidus* are both compatible with human logic. *Chukim*, on the other hand, are different:

משא"כ חוקים, הם המצוות שאינם ע"פ טעם, ורק בדרך חוקה חקקתי גזירה גזרת¹³.

Chukim don't make logical sense at all, and are simply decrees of Hashem. (For example, keeping kosher, all the laws related to ritual purity, etc.)

Based on this explanation, we see that *chukim* are clearly different than the other types of mitzvos. With this background, we return to analyzing the way that Dovid HaMelech described the pleasure he received from the Torah:

וצריך להבין מ"ש זמירות היו לי חוקיק, הרי פשוט שהתענוג והשמחה של דוד המלך בעסק התורה הי' בכל דיני התורה (גם בהדינים דעדות ומשפטים), ומהו אומרו זמירות היו לי חוקיק, חוקיק דוקא.

Question Four:

It's obvious that Dovid HaMelech enjoyed learning about **all** types of mitzvos – not just the mitzvos of *chukim*. If so, why did he specifically refer to *chukim* when he said, "Your *chukim* [laws] were to me like **songs**"?

The *ma'amar* first explains why Dovid referred to Torah as "songs" (answer to question three):

ג) **והענין** הוא, דזמירות הוא גם ענין שבח¹⁴. כדאיתא בתניא¹⁵, דמה שדוד קרא דברי תורה בשם זמירות הו"ע שבחא דאורייתא. שדוד ה' משבח את התורה בזה שחיות כל העולמות תלוי בדקדוק אחד מדקדוקי התורה.

Initially, we understood that Dovid HaMelech described the Torah as "songs" to compare the **pleasure** that he received from learning Torah to the **pleasure** of listening to a beautiful song. However, the word *zemiros* (songs) can also mean "**praises,**" which is how this *possuk* is translated by the *Targum*.

Answer to Question Three (Part One):

As the Alter Rebbe explains in Tanya, Dovid HaMelech called the Torah *zemiros* because the Torah is *zemiros* – praises – to Hashem. Specifically, he was praising the fact that even the most minute aspect of performing a mitzvah affects the G-dly life force of the entire creation.

We explain how this interpretation of *zemiros* relates to the fact that Torah gave Dovid HaMelech joy and pleasure even while he was in the lands of his enemies:

והשייכות דפירוש זה לפירוש הפשוט בזמירות היו לי חוקיק גו', הוא, דע"י ההתבוננות במעלת ושבח התורה שכל העולמות בטלים במציאות לגבי דקדוק אחד מדקדוקי תורה, עי"ז פעל בעצמו שכל עניני העולם לא יתפסו מקום אצלו, וגם כשהי' לא-טוב לו בגשמיות, הי' עוסק בתורה בשמחה גדולה¹⁶.

When a Jew meditates deeply on the fact that all of existence is *bottul* (completely dependent on and therefore insignificant in comparison) to the correct observance of even the most minute detail in Torah, this will bring him to the realization that all material things are completely insignificant to him. Therefore, even when he is "in the house of his enemies" and faces a negative situation in the physical world, his learning of Torah (which is infinitely greater) will bring him tremendous joy.

In addition to the explanation of the Alter Rebbe in Tanya, there is also an explanation provided by the Frierdiker Rebbe in the *ma'amar* from 5687:

ובהמאמר דבעל הגאולה¹⁷ מבאר עוד פירוש בזמירות היו לי חוקיך, זמירות הוא מלשון חיתוך וכריתה, כמו לזמר עריצים¹⁸. דע"י עסק התורה של דוד המלך, נתבטלו כל שונאיו ורודפיו. וכמארז"ל¹⁹ השכם והערב עליהן לבית המדרש והן כלין מאיליהן.

Answer to Question Three (Part Two):

The Frierdiker Rebbe explains that word *zemiros* is related to the phrase *l'zamer aritzim* (to "cut off" [defeat] the tyrants), an expression of "cutting off." This is because when Dovid HaMelech learned Torah, this automatically "cut off" and defeated his enemies and anyone who pursued him.

This follows the statement of the sages, "Get up early and stay late to [learn Torah] in the *bais hamedrash*, and they [your enemies] will automatically be destroyed."

The Rebbe connects the explanation of the Alter Rebbe (*zemiros* refers to "praises") to the explanation of the Frierdiker Rebbe (*zemiros* refers to the "cutting off" of your enemies):

ויש לקשר שני הפירושים, דע"י עסק התורה באופן דזמירות כהפירוש בתניא, שהי' נרגש אצלו שחיות כל העולמות תלוי

ב(דקדוק אחד של) תורה, עי"ז נעשה, דמה שאינו מתאים לתורה, ומכ"ש מה שמנגד לתורה, לא יהי' לו חיות, זמירות מלשון לזמר עריצים.

The relationship between these two explanations is a relationship of cause and effect:

When a Jew learns Torah in a way of "*zemiros*" ("praises" according to the Alter Rebbe) – he truly feels that the life force of all of creation is entirely dependent on the observance of even the smallest detail in Torah – then anything which is **incompatible** with the way of Torah, and surely anything that **opposes** Torah, won't be given any life force (and will cease to exist) – it will be "cut off" (like the explanation of the Friediker Rebbe).

Based on this, the *ma'amar* will begin to answer the fourth question: Why did Dovid HaMelech specifically refer to Torah as "*chukim*" if there are **three** types of mitzvos?

ועפ"ז יובן גם מ"ש זמירות היו לי חוקיך (חוקיך דוקא), כי שני ענינים הנ"ל שבזמירות דתורה (שבחא דאורייתא, ולזמר עריצים), הם, בעיקר, מצד ענין החוקים שבתורה.

As the *ma'amar* will soon explain, these two meanings of the *zemiros* of Torah ("praise" that the world is dependent on Torah and "cutting off" the parts of existence which oppose Torah) come from the concept of "*chukim*" in Torah.

ד) **והענין** הוא, דשתי חלוקות הכלליות שבמצוות²⁰, מצוות דעדות ומשפטים שיש עליהם טעם ומצוות דחוקים שלמעלה מהטעם, הם שני ענינים כלליים בעבודת ה', העבודה דטעם ודעת (משפטים) והעבודה דקבלת עול (חוקים), שצריכים להיות בכל מצוה ומצוה.

In general, mitzvos can be divided into two categories (as explained in the previous section): *eidus* and *mishpatim* are mitzvos which have

a logical basis, and *chukim* which are beyond logic. These two types of mitzvos correspond to two aspects of serving Hashem which are present in **every** mitzvah: serving Hashem in a logical way (*eidus* and *mishpatim*), and serving Him with *kabbalas ol* (*chukim*) beyond logic.

The *ma'amar* explains how each mitzvah has both aspects:

והענין הוא, דבמצוות יש שני ענינים²¹. א', שהמצוות הם רצונו ית', רצון שלמעלה מטעם. דענין זה הוא בכל המצוות בשוה. וב', דלאחרי שהרצון נתלבש בחכמה (דתורה), הנה עי"ז נוסף טעם לכל מצוה, וג"ז שע"י כל מצוה נמשך אור וגילוי פרטי. דזהו מה שרמ"ח פיקודין הם רמ"ח אברים דמלכא²², דכל אבר הוא כלי לכה פרטי²³. וטעמים אלו הם מצד חכמה דתורה כמו שהיא למעלה. ומזה נמשכו (ע"י ריבוי השתלשלות) טעמי המצוות שבגליא דתורה (הטעמים דעדות ומשפטים כמו שהם בפשטות)²⁴.

One aspect of every mitzvah is that it is the will of Hashem – Hashem **desires** that we perform this mitzvah, and this desire is above logic. This quality is expressed exactly the same way in each mitzvah; just like Hashem wants us to keep kosher, Hashem wants us to honor our parents.

The second aspect of every mitzvah is how each mitzvah is expressed through the **wisdom** of Torah, which causes each mitzvah to draw down and reveal a unique aspect of G-dliness. This is why the 248 positive commandments are referred to as the "248 limbs of the King": Just like each limb of a human being expresses a different ability (sight, hearing, the ability to walk, etc.), so too each mitzvah expresses a different aspect of G-dliness.

These unique ways in which each mitzvah is expressed through the G-dly wisdom of Torah eventually descend (through a process of concealment) to become the simple and logical reasons for the mitzvos (of *eidus* and *mishpatim*) which we learn in the revealed dimension of Torah.

These two aspects of each mitzvah impact our performance of each mitzvah:

וזהו מה שבקיום המצוות צריך להיות שתי כוונות, כוונה כללית וכוונה פרטית²⁵, שמצד הרצון (שלמעלה מטעם) צ"ל הכוונה כללית (קב"ע) לקיים רצון ה', ומצד הענין דטעמי המצוות צ"ל הכוונה פרטית השייכת לאותה המצוה.

Each mitzvah that we perform needs to have two intentions, a general intent and a specific intent:

1. The general (super-rational) intent in all mitzvos (equally) is to have *kabbalas ol* to fulfill the will of Hashem.
2. The specific intent for each mitzvah is based on the unique "reason" and significance for that mitzvah.

Based on this, the *ma'amar* explains how **every** mitzvah has both a rational (*mishpatim* and *eidus*) and super-rational (*chukim*) aspect:

ה) **וזהו** מה ששני הענינים דחוקים ומשפטים הם שני ענינים כלליים שבכל מצוה ומצוה. שגם המצוות דעדות ומשפטים שיש עליהם טעם צריך לקיים (בעיקר) מפני שהם רצון ה', כמו החוקים²⁶. וכן לאידך, שגם בהמצוות דחוקים יש הטעם והכוונה פרטית שבהם, מה שע"ל כל מצוה (גם המצוות דחוקים²⁷) נמשך אור וגילוי פרטי.

Even though the mitzvos of *eidus* and *mishpatim* have a logical reason for their performance, they need to be performed (mainly) because they are Hashem's will – just like the mitzvos in the category of *chukim*.

Similarly, even though the mitzvos of *chukim* are super-rational, they still have a specific purpose and draw down a unique aspect of G-dliness when they are performed. (Although they don't have a reason in the revealed dimension of Torah, the spiritual "reason" for

each one of the *chukim* is explained in *pnimius HaTorah* – the mystical dimension of Torah.)

Additionally, these two aspects of each mitzvah have an impact on every part of the everyday life of a Jew (even aspects which are not directly related to Torah and mitzvos):

ויתירה מזו, דכל אחד משני ענינים אלו (חוקים ומשפטים) הו"ע כללי בעבודת האדם, לא רק בקיום המצוות אלא גם בכללות הנהגת האדם. דענין המשפטים הוא (כמבואר בהמאמר²⁸) לשפוט כל דבר, אם זה מתאים ע"פ שכל וחכמת התורה, וגם כשהדבר מצד עצמו אין בו שום שמץ איסור, צריך לשקול היטב אם זה לא יגרום חלישות באיזה מצוה או מנהג ישראל, שאז צריך לדחות את הדבר מכל וכל. וענין חוקים הוא העבודה דקבלת עול מלכות שמים, שצריכה להיות לא רק בעת קיום מצוה אלא במשך כל היום²⁹.

The "*mishpatim*" (logical) aspect means that a Jew needs to logically analyze each aspect of his everyday life to determine if it is compatible with the Torah's overall outlook (even if it doesn't involve anything which is explicitly forbidden by the Torah). A person needs to carefully determine if a potential action could have any type of negative effect on a mitzvah or Jewish custom – and if so, needs to avoid it completely.

The "*chukim*" (*kabbalas ol*) aspect of serving Hashem needs to permeate his every action until **everything** he does expresses the fact that Hashem is his Master at every moment of the day.

In the next section, the Rebbe will connect this meaning of *chukim* to the statement of Dovid HaMelech and will explain the significance of the category of *eidus*.

Section Two

In the first section, the *ma’amar* explained the following points:

- First, we asked two questions on the *possuk* which this *ma’amar* is based on, “*Havayah* is for me with my helpers, and I shall see [revenge] in my enemies.”
 - **Question One:** Why does Dovid HaMelech imply that Hashem is “one of his helpers” if a cornerstone of Jewish faith is that Hashem is the only one that we rely on?
 - **Question Two:** Why does Dovid HaMelech request that he should see the revenge that will be taken on his enemies? Shouldn’t he ask Hashem to transform his enemies into friends instead?
- In order to answer these questions, we asked two questions on another *possuk* which the Frierdiker Rebbe explains in his *ma’amar*, “Your *chukim* [laws] were to me like songs in the house of *meguroy* [foreign places].”
 - **Question Three:** There are many different types of pleasure (from beautiful sights, smells, sounds, etc.) that a person can experience. Why did Dovid specifically compare the pleasure that he has from Torah to the pleasure one gets from hearing beautiful music?
 - **Question Four:** It’s obvious that Dovid HaMelech enjoyed learning about all types of mitzvos – not just the mitzvos of *chukim*. If so, why did he specifically refer to *chukim* (which are uniquely “beyond logic”) when he said, “Your *chukim* [laws] were to me like songs”?

- The *ma'amar* then provided two explanations of the word "*zemiros*" in order to answer question three:
 - The first explanation of the word *zemiros* was "praises." Dovid HaMelech called the Torah "*zemiros*" because when a Jew learns Torah in a way of "*zemiros*" ("praises") he truly feels that the life force of all of creation is entirely dependent on the observance of even the smallest detail in Torah.
 - The second explanation of the word *zemiros* was to "cut off." The spiritual impact of learning Torah in the way of "praises" is that anything which is incompatible with the way of Torah, and surely anything that opposes Torah, won't be given any life force (and will cease to exist) – it will be "cut off" ("I'zamer," as explained in the Friediker Rebbe's *ma'amar*). Dovid was able to defeat his enemies because he learned Torah in this way.
- In order to explain why the ability to learn Torah in a way of "*zemiros*" is related to the *chukim* aspect of serving Hashem, the *ma'amar* first explained the significance of the category of *chukim*:
 - Just like there is a distinct category of super-rational mitzvos called "*chukim*," so too there is an aspect of *chukim* in each mitzvah. The *chukim* aspect of each mitzvah (which they all share equally) is that they are Hashem's commandments and, regardless of whether we understand them or not, we do them purely because Hashem desires them.
 - Similarly, there is an aspect of *chukim* in a Jew's overall approach to his entire life (even non-mitzvah

related activities). His super-rational commitment to Hashem with *kabbalas ol* causes his every action to express the feeling that Hashem is his Master at every moment of the day.

In the following section, the Rebbe will explain **how** serving Hashem with the approach of "*chukim*" (*kabbalas ol*) causes the effect of "*zemiros*."

First the Rebbe answers question four:

It's obvious that Dovid HaMelech enjoyed learning about all types of mitzvos – not just the mitzvos of *chukim*. If so, why did he specifically refer to *chukim* (which are uniquely "beyond logic") when he said, "Your *chukim* [laws] were to me like songs"?

[Note that the Rebbe will provide a more detailed answer to question four in Chapter Ten.]

ו) **זהו** זמירות היו לי חוקיך (חוקיך דוקא), דכוונת הכתוב בחוקיך היא (לא להסוג דחוקים, כ"א) לכל המצוות, דכאשר קיומם (וכן לימודם) הוא מצד ציווי וגזירת הקב"ה (באופן דחוקיך, חוקה חקקתי גזירה גזרתי), אזי דוקא זמירות היו לי.

Answer to Question Four:

When Dovid HaMelech said that "Your *chukim* were to me like *zemiros* [songs]," he wasn't referring to the specific category of mitzvos called "*chukim*." Rather, Dovid was referring to the aspect of *chukim* within **every** mitzvah.

Therefore, Dovid was saying that when a mitzvah is done (or learned about) with the approach of *kabbalas ol* (fulfilling it because "Hashem said so," and not for any specific logical or spiritual reason), only then

is it able to have the effect of “*zemiros*” (the complete *bittul* of the world). This awareness of the complete *bittul* of the world enabled him to continue to have tremendous pleasure in his learning despite his material challenges, and also caused his learning to “cut off” of his enemies.

The Rebbe explains why the aspect of *chukim* in each mitzvah is able to have this effect:

והענין הוא, דזה שכל העולמות בטלים במציאות לגבי (דקדוק אחד מדקדוקי) תורה, הוא בעיקר מצד זה ששרש התורה הוא בכתר שלמעלה מהחכמה, שמצד בחינה זו, המצוות וכן כל דקדוקי ההלכות שבהם, הם מצד זה שכן עלה ברצונו ית', רצון שלמעלה מטעם.

The fact that the G-dly life force of the entire creation is completely insignificant in comparison to the correct fulfillment of (even the smallest detail of) a mitzvah is mainly because the Torah is rooted in Hashem’s **will** (the level of *kesser*) – it expresses what He wants – which is beyond logic. (Hashem doesn’t desire a mitzvah because it performs a certain spiritual function – He simply desires it.)

We contrast this with the level of Torah which is rooted in Hashem’s **wisdom**:

דבבחינת התורה כמו שנמשכה בחכמה, מכיון שהמצוות והדקדוקים שבהם (מצד בחינת החכמה) הם מצד הטעם, שבכדי שע”י התפילין יומשכו מוחין העליונים בעולמות צריכים להיות באופן כזה דוקא, הרי בהכרח שיש איזה ערך ותפיסת מקום להעולמות,

As they exist on the level of Hashem’s **wisdom**, the mitzvos have a “reason” (a specific spiritual function) for their performance. For example, the level of *mochin elyonim* (supernal wisdom) is drawn down into creation (which comes from the level of *midos*, supernal

emotions) through the mitzvah of *tefillin* when they are made (and worn) precisely according to every *halachic* detail.

Because this aspect of the mitzvah performs a specific function **for the world** (the *hamshacha* of *mochin elyonim*), this shows that the world has some degree of importance. Therefore, from the perspective of the Torah as it exists in Hashem's **wisdom** we cannot say that the existence of the world is completely *bottul*.

[Editor's note: In actuality, the world is dependent the fulfillment of **all** mitzvos – even *mishpatim* – for its continued existence. The *ma'amar* is explaining a deeper point: even as the world continues to exist in the merit of the mitzvos that we do, there are two ways that we can look at the relationship between mitzvos and the world. From the perspective of Hashem's **wisdom**, the mitzvos maintain the world's existence. From the perspective of Hashem's **will**, the world only exists to enable the performance of mitzvos.]

ולכן מדייק זמירות היו לי חוקיק (דוקא) בבית מגורי, דכשעסק התורה שלו הוא באופן שיודע ומרגיש שכל דקדוקי התורה הם מצד זה שכן עלה ברצונו ית' (חוקיק), אזי נרגש אצלו איך שכל העולמות בטלים במציאות לגבי דקדוק אחד מדקדוקי תורה, ובמילא, הדברי תורה שלומד הם לו זמירות (תענוג ושעשועים) גם בבית מגוריו, כי כל הרדיפות שסובל משונאיו אינם תופסים מקום אצלו, ויתירה מזו, שעי"ז נמשך כן גם בעולם, שהשונאים והרודפים מתבטלים, זמירות מלשון לזמר עריצים.

Since Dovid HaMelech was specifically praising the fact that creation is **completely bottul** to Torah, he couldn't refer to the aspect of Torah which has a connection to creation (the *mishpatim* and *eidus* aspect of each mitzvah, which is how each mitzvah exists in Hashem's wisdom). Instead, Dovid referred to the *chukim* aspect of every mitzvah which comes from Hashem's **will**, and in comparison to this level, the world has no independent significance whatsoever (it only

exists in order to enable the actual performance of Torah and mitzvos).

By referring to this level of mitzvos, Dovid was saying that "Your *chukim* [performing and learning about mitzvos in a way of *kabbalas ol*] were *zemiros* for me when I was in foreign places." This includes both meanings of *zemiros*:

1. When I did (and learned about) mitzvos in a way of *chukim*, I was truly aware of the reality that the "praise of the Torah" (*zemiros*) is that the world is completely insignificant in comparison to the Torah, and this gave me tremendous pleasure (like one gets pleasure from beautiful music, *zemiros*). The fact that I was in the foreign lands of my enemies didn't interfere with this pleasure, as my physical existence was completely insignificant in comparison to my pleasure in Torah.
2. When I performed mitzvos and learned Torah in this way, it drew down a level of G-dliness into the world which automatically "cut off" (*zemiros* related to the word *l'zamer* – to cut off) the existence of my enemies who were not compatible with (and opposed) the true way of Torah.

Until this point in the *ma'amar*, we have divided mitzvos (and the aspects of serving Hashem within each mitzvah) into two general categories: the categories of *mishpatim* and *eidus* which are compatible with logic, and the category of *chukim* which is beyond logic. The following section of the *ma'amar* will provide a deeper explanation of the category of *chukim* by contrasting it with the category of *eidus*.

(ז) **וביאור** הענין בעומק יותר, יובן בהקדים תחילה ענין עדות. שגם ענין זה הוא בכל המצוות (גם בהמצוות דחוקים ודמשפטים), ע"ד שנת"ל בנוגע למשפטים וחוקים.

Above, we explained that in addition to representing a distinct category of mitzvos, *chukim* also represents an aspect of serving Hashem within each mitzvah. Similarly, the categories of *eidus* and *mishpatim* also refer to aspects of serving Hashem within each mitzvah. (The section below will focus exclusively on the *eidus* aspect.)

והענין הוא, כמו שמבאר בעל הגאולה בהמאמר ד"ה ויקם³⁰ עדות ביעקב ותורה שם בישראל³¹, דמה שהמצוות (גם המצוות דמשפטים ודחוקים) נק' עדות הוא לפי שהם ממשיכים ומגלים העלם העצמי דעצמות אוא"ס, שלמעלה מההעלם השייך לגילוי.

The Frierdiker Rebbe points out that all mitzvos are collectively referred to as *eidus*, such as in the *possuk* "*Va'yakam eidus b'Yaakov*" (He established *eidus* [mitzvos] in [the nation of] Ya'akov). He explains that the reason why all mitzvos are referred to as *eidus* is because the "*eidus*" aspect of each mitzvah is the fact that they reveal "the essentially concealed level of the *ein sof*, which is higher than the level of concealed G-dliness which is able to be revealed." [We will explain this statement shortly.]

We explain why the concept of *eidus* refers to a level which is "higher than revelation":

דכמו שענין העדות בפשטות הוא על דבר הנעלם דוקא, דעל דבר הגלוי אין שייך עדות, מכיון שהוא גלוי, ואפילו על מילתא דעבידא לאגלויי אין צריך עדות³²,

The simple meaning of the word *eidus* refers to the testimony of two witnesses. The Gemara explains that facts that can be verified through observation do not require *eidus* (testimony of witnesses),

and even facts that aren't currently observable but will be observable at a later time do not need *eidus*. (Since both of these can be observed at some point, we trust that someone will not lie regarding facts that be easily verified.)

The only case when *eidus* is needed is when the facts that need to be verified are "completely concealed" and are impossible to observe. (For example, an event which happened in the past and then stopped.)

The fact that *eidus* is connected to something which is "completely concealed" is also true on a spiritual level:

עד"ז הוא ברוחניות, דאור הממלא הוא דבר הגלוי שמושג מצד השכל, וכידוע³³ בענין ומבשרי³⁴ אחזה אלוהה, דכמו שברור לאדם שיש נפש שמח' את גופו, דע"י שמרגיש שגופו חי הוא יודע ברור שאין זה מצד הגוף עצמו אלא שיש נפש שמח' את גופו, כמו"כ הוא גם בנוגע לעולם, דע"י שרואים עולם חי יודעים בבירור³⁵ שיש חיות אלקי שמח' את העולם.

"Facts which are presently observable" correspond to the level of *mimalei kol almin* (the limited level of G-dliness which is involved with creation), the level of G-dliness which can be understood through human intellect.

For example, the *possuk* says "from my flesh I perceive Hashem." A person is able to feel that his body is alive, and can clearly understand that it is not self-sustaining – it depends on the soul to give it life. Similarly, a person is able to **see** that the world is alive, and conclude that it also is not self-sustaining and depends on a G-dly force to give it life.

ואור הסובב שלמעלה מהתלבשות בעולמות הוא מילתא דעבידא לאגלווי (העלם ששייך לגילוי). וכמבואר בכ"מ³⁶, דע"י ההשגה באור הממלא שמתלבש בעולמות, שהוא הארה בלבד (כדמוכח מזה גופא שהוא בהתלבשות), מזה באים לידי ידיעה שישנו אור שהוא מופלא

מעולמות, שהוא המקור שממנו נמשך ההארה שבהתלבשות. והוא ע"ד מה שהשכל גופא מכריח שיש למעלה מהשכל.

The concept of "facts which are not presently observable, but will be observable at a later time" corresponds to the level of *sovev kol almin*, the level of G-dliness which is beyond the limits of creation.

Even though human intellect cannot **directly** understand (become aware of) the level of *sovev kol almin*, it is possible to be aware of it through an **indirect** process. When a person becomes aware of *mimalei kol almin* (the G-dly life force within creation), he will realize that *mimalei kol almin* is only a "ray" (external expression) of G-dliness, and this "ray" must be the external expression of a higher level of G-dliness – *sovev kol almin*.

Similar to how a person is capable of understanding that human intellect is limited, and therefore there must be something beyond human intellect, a person is also able to recognize the existence of *sovev kol almin* (G-dliness which is "beyond" creation) through his direct recognition of *mimalei kol almin*.

Eidus (testimony) is not required for either of these categories, so the corresponding spiritual level of *eidus* is also beyond these spiritual levels of *mimalei* and *sovev*.

וענין העדות הוא בעצמות אוא"ס, שלמעלה גם מסובב, שהוא נעלם לגמרי, ואין שייך בו שום ידיעה והשגה, גם לא ידיעת השלילה³⁷.

The concept of *eidus* refers to the essence of *ohr ein sof* which is higher than *sovev kol almin*. This level is "completely concealed" and creation cannot even gain an awareness of its existence (unlike *sovev kol almin*).

וזהו מה שכל המצוות נק' עדות, לפי שהם ממשיכים ומגלים עצמות או"ס שלמעלה גם מסובב.

Therefore, the *eidus* aspect within **every** mitzvah is that a mitzvah draws down and reveals the essence of *ohr ein sof* which is even higher than *sovev kol almin*.

In the earlier sections of the *ma'amar* we grouped *eidus* together with *mishpatim* because they both can be understood through human logic. However, this new explanation of (the aspect of) *eidus* (within each mitzvah) seems to place it in a different category:

ה) **וצריך** להבין, והרי זה שהמצוות הם עדות על עצמות או"ס הוא מפני שהם רצונו ית', רצון שלמעלה מטעם³⁸, ומהו החילוק בין ענין עדות לענין חוקים.

Mitzvos serve as "*eidus*" (a "witness" who reveals the existence) of the essence of *ohr ein sof* because they are the **will** of Hashem which is beyond logic.

Question Five:

If the *eidus* aspect of mitzvos is also connected to the will of Hashem which is beyond logic, how is the *eidus* aspect of mitzvos different than the *chukim* aspect of mitzvos that we described in the previous section?

וגם צריך להבין השייכות של הסוג דמצוות שנק' עדות מפני שהם אות וזכרון, ענין הטעם, עם ענין העדות שבכללות המצוות, זה שהם מעידים על עצמות או"ס מפני שהם רצון שלמעלה מטעם.

Question Six:

What is the connection between the simple definition of the category of *eidus* – mitzvos which **logically** commemorate an idea or event – and the deeper significance of the aspect of *eidus* in each mitzvah –

the fact that a mitzvah is connected to the **super-rational** will of Hashem and reveals the essence of *ohr ein sof*?

In order to answer these questions, we explain the significance of *eidus* and *chukim* within a Jew's service of Hashem:

והענין הוא, דענין העדות שבמצוות בעבודת האדם היא העבודה דרעותא דלבא³⁹, דרעותא דלבא הוא הרצון באלקות שמצד עצם הנשמה, שע"ז תופסים בהעצמות, כמאמר⁴⁰ לית מחשבה תפיסא בי כלל (בי קאי על פנימיות ועצמות אוא"ס שלמעלה מסובב, שאינו נתפס בשום השגה, גם לא בהשגת השליה) אבל נתפס איהו ברעותא דלבא. והעבודה דחוקים היא העבודה דקבלת עול.

The Rebbe Rashab explains that the aspect of *eidus* within a Jew's service of Hashem is the service of *re'usa d'liba* – the desire of the heart. Just like *eidus* (testimony from witnesses) "reveals" facts which are unable to be observed, so too *re'usa d'liba* reveals the soul's natural love for Hashem which was previously "hidden."

Since *re'usa d'liba* refers to the soul's **essential** desire for Hashem, and the essence of the soul is rooted in Hashem's essence, it therefore has the capability of connecting a Jew to Hashem's essence. This is why the introduction to the Tikkunei Zohar states that, "No thought can grasp Him [His essence] at all [not even through indirect comprehension] – but He [His essence] **can** be grasped with *re'usa d'liba*."

The aspect of *chukim*, as explained in the previous section, represents serving Hashem with *kabbalas ol*.

The *ma'amar* explains the difference between these two types of service:

דהחילוק שבין שתי עבודות אלו הוא, דבהעבודה דרעותא דלבא, מכיון שיש לו רצון, הגם שהרצון הוא מצד ההתקשרות דעצם הנשמה בעצמות אוא"ס, ה"ה בבחינת מציאות עדיין⁴¹. וגם כשהרצון

שלו הוא בביטול, שאינו רוצה לעצמו כלל וכל רצונו הוא שיהי' גילוי אלקות בעולם ושתושלם הכוונה דדירה⁴² לו ית' בתחתונים, מ"מ, עצם ענין הרצון הוא מציאות.

Even though the service of *re'usa d'liba* is a desire which comes from the fact that the essence of the soul is connected to Hashem's essence, the fact that the soul "wants" something implies some feeling of "self." And even in a case where the soul's desire for Hashem isn't motivated by its **own** natural love, and the only reason that it wants to connect to Hashem is because it wants to reveal G-dliness within the world to accomplish **Hashem's** goal of *dirah b'tachtonim*, this act of "desiring something" still implies some aspect of "self."

ואמיתית ענין הביטול הוא בהעבודה דקבלת עול⁴³, שהוא כמו עבד שאין לו שום רצונות כלל, וכל מה שעושה הוא מצד עול האדון שמוטל עליו, שמצד זה הוא **מוכרח** לקיים רצון האדון.

True *bittul* can only be achieved through *kabbalas ol*. Unlike *re'usa d'liba*, when someone has *kabbalas ol* they resemble a servant who doesn't have any desires **at all** (even selfless desires), and everything that he does is simply because he is **required** to do so by his master (and not because he **wants** to fulfill his master's desire).

Based on the difference between the services of Hashem represented by *chukim* and *eidus*, we can also understand the difference between the aspect of *chukim* and *eidus* in each mitzvah:

ט) **והנה** החילוק שבין העבודה דעדות להעבודה דחוקים הוא דוגמת החילוק שביניהם בענין המצוות עצמם. ויובן זה ע"פ הידוע⁴⁴ שהרצון דמצוות כמו שהוא מצד העצמות הוא רצון עצמי שאינו בשביל איזה כוונה שתושלם ע"י המצוות, והתכלית דמצוות (מצד רצון זה) הוא המצוות עצמם.

In His essence, Hashem doesn't desire the mitzvos because they accomplish something. Rather, Hashem desires the mitzvos **themselves** – the performance of the mitzvah is the ultimate goal.

We are now able to answer questions five and six:

ומזה מובן, דזה שהמצוות ממשיכים ומגלים עצמות או"ס בעולם, עם היות שההמשכה היא מצד זה שהמצוות הם רצונו ית' שלמעלה מטעם, מ"מ, מכיון שזהו ענין **שנעשה** ע"י המצוות, הרי זה בדוגמת טעם. ואמיתית הענין דרצון העצמי של עצמותו ית' הוא בהמצוות גופא.

Question Five:

If the *eidus* aspect of mitzvos is also connected to the will of Hashem which is beyond logic, how is the *eidus* aspect of mitzvos different than the *chukim* aspect of mitzvos that we described in the previous section?

Answer to Question Five:

The fact that mitzvos reveal the essence of *ohr ein sof* in creation (the aspect of *eidus* in each mitzvah) refers to the goal which the mitzvos **accomplish**. We therefore must say that this aspect of a mitzvah can't be the reflection of Hashem's **ultimate** will, because Hashem's ultimate will is for the mitzvos **themselves** – not what they accomplish.

Question Six:

What is the connection between the simple definition of the category of *eidus* – mitzvos which **logically** commemorate an idea or event – and the deeper significance of the aspect of *eidus* in each mitzvah – the fact that a mitzvah is connected to the **super-rational** will of Hashem and reveals the essence of *ohr ein sof*?

[In other words, how can the concept of *eidus* include both rational **and** super-rational aspects?]

Answer to Question Six:

Even though mitzvos are able to reveal the essence of *ohr ein sof* in creation because they come from Hashem's essential desire which is **above reason** (super-rational), the very fact that they accomplish a goal (the revelation of the essence of *ohr ein sof* is the "reason" for their performance) shows that this level has some resemblance to the concept of **reason** (logic). [This resemblance to the concept of reason in the aspect of *eidus* within each mitzvah is related to the fact that the mitzvos in the category of *eidus* logically commemorate an idea or event.]

In Hashem's true essence, His desire for mitzvos has no connection to reason whatsoever, and the ultimate goal is the mitzvos themselves.

Based on this, we're able to understand why *re'usa d'liba* corresponds to *eidus* and *kabbalas ol* corresponds to *chukim*:

וזהו מה שהעבודה דעדות היא העבודה דרעותא דלבא והעבודה דחוקים היא העבודה דקבלת עול, כי ענין העדות שבמצוות, מכיון שהוא המשכה וגילוי, הכלי לזה הוא הרצון, שגם הרצון שמצד עצם הנשמה היא תנועה דהמשכה והתפשטות (מציאות), והכלי לענין החוקים דמצוות שהוא רצון עצמי ממש שלמעלה מגילוי הוא הביטול דקבלת עול, ביטול שמצד העצם שלמעלה מכל ענין דהתפשטות.

The aspect of *eidus* in mitzvos – the fact that mitzvos reveal the essence of *ohr ein sof* in creation – relates to the drawing down and **revelation** of the essence of Hashem. Therefore, this level can be accessed when a Jew serves Hashem with an **external expression** of his soul's desire to connect to Him – *re'usa d'liba*.

The aspect of *chukim* in mitzvos – the fact that Hashem desires the mitzvos themselves – relates to the essence of G-dliness which is **beyond** expression. Therefore, this level can be accessed when a Jew serves Hashem with complete *bittul* (the **absence** of ("beyond") any external expression or expression of "self") – *kabbalas ol*.

Based on this explanation of the difference between *chukim* and *eidus*, we are now able to provide a more detailed answer to question four:

Why did Dovid HaMelech specifically refer to *chukim* (and not *eidus*) when he said, "Your *chukim* were to me like songs"?

י"ד) **וזהו** זמירות היו לי חוקיך (דוקא), שכוונתו בזה היא לשלול לא רק הענין דמשפטים אלא גם הענין דעדות. כי בדרגת העדות נשארה עדיין איזו מציאות. ולא רק מצד האדם, שגם הרצון שלו שלמעלה מטו"ד (רעו"ד) הוא מציאות (כנ"ל), אלא גם מצד המצוות שבדרגת עדות, מכיון שענינם הוא המשכת וגילוי אוא"ס בעולם.

Earlier in the *ma'amar*, we explained that Dovid used the word *chukim* to describe the mitzvos because the aspect of *chukim* in each mitzvah is beyond "reason," and his joy from learning Torah wasn't disturbed by his physical suffering at the hands of his enemies because creation is completely *bottul* from the perspective of this level.

However, based on our earlier explanation of *eidus* (the fact that they reveal the essence of *ohr ein sof*), it would seem that the level of *eidus* would also have this effect. Why did Dovid specifically exclude *eidus* from his statement?

Based on our new understanding of the difference between *chukim* and *eidus* we are able to answer this question. Dovid was specifically referring to a level of G-dliness that is **completely above** any connection to creation. Since the aspect of *eidus* is accessed through the service of *re'usa d'liba* (which is an **expression** of the of the soul),

and the level of *eidus* itself has a "reason" (the revelation of Hashem's essence **in creation**), it therefore cannot cause the **complete** *bittul* of creation.

ואמיתית ושלימות ההכרה שכל העולמות בטלים במציאות לגבי דקדוק אחד דתורה הוא דוקא בהדרגא דחוקים, שהדקדוקים דתורה (שמצד בחינה זו) הם ענין עצמי מצד שרשם העצמי שבתורה, שלמעלה משייכות לעולם.

Answer to Question Four:

Only the appreciation of the aspect of *chukim*, which is completely above any connection to creation, can bring a Jew to the realization that the entire creation is completely *bottul* to (even one detail in) the Torah. At this level, the Torah's details aren't intended to accomplish a purpose; rather, they are simply Hashem's essential desire.

In the next section, the Rebbe will explain why Dovid HaMelech was punished for praising the Torah in this way.

Section Three

In the first two sections of the *ma'amar*, the Rebbe explained the following points:

- Our *ma'amar* is based on the *possuk*, "*Havayah* is for me with my helpers, and I shall see [revenge] in my enemies." We asked two questions on this *possuk*:
 - **Question One:** Why does Dovid HaMelech imply that Hashem is "one of" his helpers if Hashem is the **only** one that we rely on?
 - **Question Two:** Why does Dovid HaMelech ask for revenge against his enemies instead of asking for them to be transformed into friends?
- In order to answer these questions (which will be answered at the end of the *ma'amar*), we introduced another *possuk*: "*Your chukim* [laws] were to me like *zemiros* [songs] in the house of *meguroy* [foreign places]." We asked (and answered) four questions related to this *possuk*, which led us to the following points:
 - Dovid HaMelech called the Torah "*zemiros*" because the word *zemiros* can mean both "praise" and "to cut off." Dovid **praised** the Torah for the fact that the world is completely *bottul* (insignificant) in comparison to even the slightest detail in Torah. Because he learned with the awareness of this praise, his learning brought a level of G-dliness into the world that only gave strength to things that were compatible with the Torah – and therefore **cut off** the enemies which were opposing him.

- Because Dovid was referring to this specific level called "*zemiros*," therefore he referred to the Torah as *chukecha* [Your *chukim*]. Just like there are specific super-rational mitzvos called "*chukim*," so too there is a super-rational "*chukim*" aspect to every mitzvah. On the level of *mishpatim*, each mitzvah performs a specific spiritual **function** for the world. On the level of *eidus*, each mitzvah reveals Hashem's **essence** within creation. But on the level of *chukim*, the mitzvos don't serve the world – it's the other way around. The world only exists in order to make the fulfillment of mitzvos possible. Because Dovid was referring to this **complete** *bittul* of creation, he specifically referred to the aspect of *chukim* within each mitzvah.

However, the Gemara explains that Dovid was punished for referring to the Torah as "*zemiros*." In this section of the *ma'amar*, the Rebbe will explain why.

יא) **וממשיך** בהמאמר⁴⁵, דמה שדוד נענש על זה⁴⁶ הוא כי עסק התורה דדוד ה' באופן דלזמר עריצים (כנ"ל), ותכלית הכוונה היא כמ"ש⁴⁷ לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה, להתעסק בעבודת הבירורים ולהמשיך גילוי אור בעולם.

During the time of Eli the Kohen Gadol, the *Plishtim* (Philistines) captured the *aron* (the ark which held the tablets containing the *Aseres HaDibros*), but they soon returned it to the Jews on a wagon. It was kept in the home of a *tzadik* named Avinadav for many years until Dovid HaMelech wanted to return it to *Yerushalayim*.

Dovid ordered the people to send it back to *Yerushalayim* on the same wagon that the *Plishtim* sent it back on (according to Rashi, he

did this in order to remind people of the great miracle which happened when it was returned by the *Plishtim*) – but this was a mistake, as the *aron* is only supposed to be carried by its staves on the shoulders of the Levi'im, not on a wagon.

While it was being carried on the wagon it started to shake, so Uzza, the son of Avinadav, reached out to steady it with his hand. Hashem killed him and said, "If the *aron* can carry those who carry it, surely it can carry itself [and it doesn't need your help]." Since Dovid was the one who had decided to carry it on the wagon, the Gemara explains that the death of Uzza was ultimately Dovid's responsibility.

The Gemara goes on to explain that Dovid was punished for calling the Torah "*zemiros*," and his punishment was the fact that he forgot the *halacha* that says that the *aron* must only be carried by its staves (on the shoulders of the Levi'im) – which resulted in the death of Uzza.

Based on what we learned above, *zemiros* represents the complete *bittul* of creation to Torah. What was wrong with Dovid having this perspective on the Torah?

The answer is that Dovid's approach was not compatible with the ultimate purpose of creation. The ultimate purpose of creation is **not** that it should be "pushed away" through the perspective that it is completely *bottul* to the Torah. As the *navi* explains, "He [Hashem] did not create it [the world] for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited."

Chassidus explains that this means that Hashem didn't create the world in order to simply "push away" and "cut off" anything that isn't immediately compatible with Torah. Rather, Hashem wants us to refine the physical world ("He formed it to be inhabited") so G-dliness is revealed **within** the physical world.

These two approaches (“rejecting the world” and “refining the world”) are represented by the two methods of refining the world: through Torah and through *davening*:

דזהו המעלה שבתפלה לגבי תורה, דתפלה הוא בירור והעלאתה, היינו שע"י התפלה מתבררים הניצוצות ומזדככים ועולים למעלה, משא"כ תורה היא המשכה מלמעלה, והבירור ע"י התורה הוא בדרך דחי'.

Davening is the process of working **with** the physical world (through refining one's animal soul) to elevate it from “below to above.” When a Jew deals with “imperfect” physical world and uses it in the correct way, he is able to release the “sparks of G-dliness” which are contained within it. This allows the sparks to “ascend above,” revealing that the object was created to be used for a G-dly purpose.

Torah, on the other hand, is the process of bringing G-dliness into the world “from above to below,” which shows the world how it **should** be. Instead of refining things as they exist in their imperfect state, this method of refinement simply “rejects” anything which is incompatible with the framework of Torah.

וכשרצה דוד לברר בירורים ע"י התורה, שהוא בדרך דחי', לזמר עריצים, נענש על זה, כי תכלית הכוונה הוא לשבת יצרה.

Dovid HaMelech called the Torah “*zemiros*” because he thought the appropriate way to refine the world is “from above to below” through [the *chukim* aspect of] Torah, which “cuts off” anything which isn't compatible with the framework of Torah. Because this was a mistake (and the true **purpose** of the physical world is “to be inhabited [by G-dliness after refining it]”, Dovid was punished for trying to refine the world through the tremendous revelation of *chukim* aspect of Torah – which automatically negates anything which opposes Torah.

However, based on our earlier explanation of the level of *zemiros*, it is hard to understand how Dovid could have made this mistake:

וצריך להבין, הרי עסק התורה דדוד באופן דזמירות היו לי חוקיך הוא בבחינת התורה כמו שהיא מצד רצון העצמי (כנ"ל בארוכה), והיאך שייך שזה יהי' שלא כפי אמיתית הכוונה.

As we explained above, the level of *zemiros* comes from the aspect of "Your *chukim*" – the connection to Hashem's will as it is expressed in His **essence**.

Question Seven:

If Dovid was connected to Hashem's **essence**, how is it possible for him to make a mistake regarding (Hashem's will for) the ultimate purpose of creation?

In order to answer this question, the Rebbe references another topic which was explained in the Frierdiker Rebbe's *ma'amar* (the *ma'amar* which our *ma'amar* is based on):

ויש לומר הביאור בזה, ע"פ מ"ש בהמאמר בתחילתו בענין הוי' אחד⁴⁸, דפירוש אחד זה הוא יחיד, ומה שאומרים אחד ולא יחיד הוא להורות דהוי' ואלקים כולא חד⁴⁹.

We say in *shema*, "*Havayah* is our G-d, *Havayah* is *echad* (**one**)."
However, it seems that "*Havayah* is one" is not the best choice of words; this could be taken to imply that *Havayah* is **one**, and then there are (G-d forbid) additional forces in creation as well – two, three, etc. It would seem more accurate to say that "*Havayah* is *yochid* (singular)," which doesn't imply that there is a second, third, etc.

The Frierdiker Rebbe explains that the meaning of the word *echad* (one) in this sentence is actually *yochid* (singular), but the word *echad* is used to show that the two (seemingly) different forces of *Havayah* (G-dliness above creation) and *Elokim* (the nature of creation) are truly **one**.

We explain why the concept of the unity of *Havayah* and *Elokim* is so important that it justifies using the (potentially misleading) term *echad*:

והענין הוא, דאמיתית ענין אחדות הוי' הוא שהאחדות היא גם מצד העולם. וזהו מ"ש הוי' אחד, דבאם הוי' כתיב הוי' יחיד, הוי' הפירוש בזה שיחודו ית' הוא מצד אוא"ס (ולא מצד העולם), ובכדי להדגיש שיחודו ית' הוא גם מצד העולם, ואפילו מצד העולם כמו שנברא משם אלקים שמעלים ומסתיר על שם הוי', לכן נאמר⁵⁰ הוי' אחד, שגם החי"ת והדל"ת שהם ז' רקיעים וארץ וד' רוחות העולם, הם בטלים להאל"ף יחידו של עולם⁵¹. דמכיון שהוי' ואלקים כולא חד, הרי שם אלקים אינו מסתיר באמת, ולכן, גם העולם שנתהווה משם אלקים הוא בטל באמת ואין עוד מלבדו⁵². ועד להביטול בדרגת ואופן דיחיד שלמעלה מאחד.

If the *possuk* would say, "*Havayah* is *yochid*," this would imply that we're looking at creation from the perspective of *Havayah* (unlimited G-dliness). From this perspective, the entire creation is truly insignificant.

In order to stress the fact that Hashem's unity can **also** be seen from the perspective of the limited creation, we use the word *echad* to show that even the physical world, which is created through the name *Elokim* which **conceals** the name *Havayah*, can also recognize Hashem's ultimate unity.

This is why the world *echad* is spelled "אחד":

- The "א" has a value of 1 and represents Hashem's complete and absolute unity.
- The "ח" has a value of 8, which represents how Hashem's unity includes all seven *reki'im* (levels within the spiritual worlds) and the one physical world.

- The "ד" has the value of four, which represents all four directions within the physical world.

Since Hashem's unity includes both *Havayah* (unlimited) and *Elokim* (limited), therefore *Elokim's* concealment of *Havayah* is not a true concealment, and even the limited physical world (which is created through *Elokim*) is an expression of Hashem's ultimate unity.

[Editor's note: Chassidus explains this by analyzing the *halacha* concerning what a person should do if he doesn't have a *yarmulke*. If a person covers his head with his own hand, this doesn't count as a "head covering," as covering yourself with yourself doesn't help! On the other hand, he could use his friend's hand as a *yarmulke*, as his friend is considered "something else" and does, in fact, conceal his head.

The same is true with *Havayah* and *Elokim*; since both names (abilities) of Hashem are expressions of His true essence, one cannot conceal the other – it is like covering your head with your own hand.

End of editor's note.]

Furthermore, not only is creation able to recognize that it is completely dependent on and *bottul* to G-dliness (*echad*); it is even able to see the perspective of *yochid* – that all of creation is completely insignificant – from **within** its own perspective in the limited world.

וע"י היחוד דשני הענינים (שיחודו ית' הוא באופן דיחיד, ושענין זה הוא גם מצד העולם), עי"ז הוא גילוי כח העצמות שכולל ומחבר הענין דאחד ודיחיד.

By refining the world "from below to above" and revealing that the physical world is also an (equal) expression of Hashem's essence, this reveals the ability of Hashem's true essence to unite both *yochid* (the

fact that He is the only true existence) **and** *echad* (the ability to see creation from Hashem's perspective from within the limited world).

Based on this, we see that there are three aspects to Hashem's unity:

1. Hashem's ultimate essence (which includes both *echad* and *yochid*)
2. *Echad*, Hashem's unity from the perspective of the limited creation
3. *Yochid*, Hashem's unity from His perspective – the fact that He is the only true existence

These three concepts of Hashem's unity can be seen within the name *Havayah*:

ויש להוסיף, דשם הוי' (הוי' אחד) מורה על כל ג' הענינים (אחד ויחיד וכח העצמות שמחברם). דבהוי' יש ג' ענינים: א' הוי' מלשון מהוה⁵³, דפירוש זה בשם הוי' מורה על שייכותו לעולמות, ב' הוי' מלשון ה' הוה ויהי⁵⁴, דפירוש זה בשם הוי' מורה שהוא למעלה מעולמות, וענין הג' בשם הוי' הוא שהוי' הוא שם העצם⁵⁵, היינו שהוא מורה על עצמותו ית'.

There are three explanations of the name *Havayah*:

1. The name *Havayah* is related to the verb *me'haveh* (to create), and represents how the name *Havayah* is involved with the creation of the **limited** world.
2. The name *Havayah* can be interpreted as a contraction of the Hebrew words for past, present, and future. This represents how *Havayah* is **beyond** creation (and exists on a level where the limits of time do not exist).
3. The name *Havayah* is Hashem's "essential name" and refers to Hashem's **essence**.

The Rebbe addresses an apparent contradiction to an explanation of the name *Havayah* from the Ramak:

דהגם שבפרדס⁵⁶ כתב דזה ששם הוי' הוא שם העצם הוא רק לעצם הספירות, היינו האורות המתלבשים בכלים, הרי המסקנא דתורת החסידות⁵⁷ היא דפירוש שם העצם הוא בהעצמות.

Even though the Ramak explains in the sefer *Pardes* that the name *Havayah* refers to the essence of the *sefiros* of *Atzilus* (meaning the *ohr* [light] which is invested in the *kelim* [containers] of *Atzilus*, and **not** the essence of Hashem Himself), Chassidus reaches a different conclusion. It says that "before the world was created, only He and His Name were in existence," and Chassidus explains that this "creation" includes the revelation of the *sefiros* of *Atzilus*, so "His Name" (His essential name, *Havayah*) **preceded** the revelation of *Atzilus* (as it is part of His essence).

The *ma'amar* returns to the three explanations of *Havayah*:

והנה מכיון שכל ג' הענינים הם באותו שם, הרי מובן⁵⁸ שהם שייכים זל"ז. והיינו דההתאחדות דשני הפירושים בהוי', הוי' לשון מהוה והוי' מלשון ה' הוה ויהי' כאחד, הוא מצד זה שהוי' הוא שם העצם. ונמצא, דע"י שהוי' שלמעלה מעולמות (ה' הוה ויהי' כאחד) נמשך בהוי' לשון מהוה, אף שבחיצוניות הו"ע של ירידה, הנה עי"ז דוקא מתגלה שם העצם שבו.

Since all three explanations are regarding the same name – the name *Havayah* – this shows that all three are connected to one another. Specifically, the relationship between them is that the fact that *Havayah* is related to the word for "creation" (*me'haveh*) and the fact that *Havayah* is a contraction of "past, present, and future" are both **caused** by the fact that *Havayah* is the name which refers to Hashem's essence.

In other words, even though it seems that revealing the level of G-dliness which is above creation (past, present, and future as one) within the level of G-dliness which brings creation into existence (*me'haveh*) is a "descent" to a lower level, in actuality this unification of both levels reveals the ultimate essence of G-dliness which is beyond both of them.

ולא עוד אלא שגילוי שם העצם דהוי' הוא בעיקר בהוי' לשון מהוה. וכמבואר בכ"מ⁵⁷ דמה ששם הוי' הוא שם העצם שמורה על העצמות הוא כי ההתהוות יש מאין היא דוקא בכח העצמות שמציאותו מעצמותו⁵⁹.

Furthermore, the **main** revelation of the ultimate unity of Hashem's essence is within the name *Havayah* which is involved with creation. As explained in other *ma'amarim*, the name *Havayah* (which implies a connection to the process of creation) refers to Hashem's essence because the creation of "something from nothing" is an ability that is only present in Hashem's essence, as He is an "essential existence," and not an existence which is brought into being by something else.

Understanding these three aspects of the name *Havayah* – and the relationship between them – helps us understand the exact wording which the Rambam uses to describe the mitzvah of "knowing" Hashem:

(יג) **ועפ"ז** יובן גם מ"ש הרמב"ם⁶⁰ (הובא במאמר הנ"ל בתחילתו) יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא, וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו.

At the beginning of the Mishnah Torah, the Rambam describes the mitzvah to "know" Hashem as:

The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all [types of] wisdom is to know that there is a First Existence which

brings into being all of existence, and everything which exists in the heavens and the earth – and everything in-between – only exists due to His True Existence.

דמצות הידיעה היא בג' ענינים. שיש שם מצוי ראשון, שהוא ממציא כל נמצא, ושכל הנמצאים כו' לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו.

This obligation to understand Hashem's existence can be divided into three aspects:

1. There is a First Existence
2. This First Existence brings into being all of existence
3. Everything which exists only exists due to His True Existence

דג' ענינים אלו הם נגד ג' ענינים הנ"ל בהוי'. יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות הוא ר"ת הוי'⁶¹. מצוי ראשון הוא שהוא קדום לכל, למעלה מהבריאה. ממציא כל נמצא הוא הוי' לשון מהוה. וכל הנמצאים כו' לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו, אמיתת המצאו הוא העצמות שמציאותו מעצמותו⁶², דהתהוות הנמצאים יש מאין הוא בכח העצמות (כנ"ל), ענין שם העצם.

The first letter of each of the first four words of the Rambam's opening statement "יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות" (The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all types of wisdom) combine to spell the name *Havayah*, and the three aspects of understanding Hashem's existence correspond to the three aspects of the name *Havayah* described above:

1. The fact that Hashem is a "First Existence" refers to how *Havayah* is "before" (beyond) creation.
2. The fact that Hashem "brings into being all of existence" refers to how *Havayah* is related to the word "*me'haveh*" – to **create**.

3. The fact that "Everything which exists only exists due to His True Existence" refers to Hashem's **essence**, described as "His True Existence." His ability to bring creation into existence (the heavens and the earth, and everything in-between) refers to Hashem's unique ability to create something from nothing – which is only present in Hashem's essence.

This also explains why the Rambam used the words "יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות" (The foundation of all foundations and the pillar of all wisdom) to spell out the name *Havayah*:

(יד) **ויש** לומר, דזהו גם מה שהוי' הוא ר"ת יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, דיסודות וחכמות הם שני ענינים הפכיים. דיסודות הם ההנחות הפשוטות שלמעלה מהבנין, מהסברה, שהם יסודי ההשגה, וחכמות הם הסברות השכליות שנתפסות בהשכלה ועד ששייך בהם שקו"ט. דבעבודת האדם ענין היסודות הוא האמונה פשוטה שלמעלה מהשכל, וחכמות הו"ע ההשגה.

The two concepts of "foundations" and "wisdom" are opposites:

- "Foundations" refer to the fundamental rules of logic. These are the **unquestionable** rules which must exist in order for the system of logic to function. Within the service of Hashem, this is represented by *emunah* – pure and unquestioning faith in Hashem.
- "All [types of] wisdom" refers to logical explanations that are understood within the system of logic and can therefore be discussed and **questioned** in order to comprehend them. Within the service of Hashem, this is represented by understanding – the process of comprehending G-dliness.

These two halves of the Rambam's statement correspond to the two opposite aspects of *Havayah*:

וי"ל דשרש היסודות הוא בהוי' שלמעלה מעולמות (הי' הוה ויהי' כאחד), ושרש החכמות הוא בהוי' לשון מהוה, והכח שמאחד היסודות והחכמות, שהאמונה שלמעלה מהשכל תומשך גם בשכל, הוא משם הוי' שם העצם.

- The root of "foundations" (and *emunah*) is from the aspect of *Havayah* which is beyond creation (past, present, and future as one).
- The root of "all wisdom" (and serving Hashem with understanding) is from the aspect of *Havayah* which is involved with creation (*me'haveh*).
- Both of these opposite aspects are united (included within the same phrase whose acronym spells out "*Havayah*") by the fact that *Havayah* refers to Hashem's **essence**. Within the service of Hashem, this refers to how the pure faith in Hashem can become the foundation of one's (limited) understanding of G-dliness.

We are now able to answer question seven:

Question Seven:

If Dovid was connected to Hashem's **essence**, how was it possible for him to make a mistake regarding (Hashem's will for) the ultimate purpose of creation?

ועפ"ז יובן מה שדוד נענש על מה שאמר זמירות היו לי חוקיך, כי התורה כמו שהיא מצד רצון העצמי שלמעלה מטעם (יסודות) היא דוגמת הוי' מלשון הי' הוה ויהי' כאחד שלמעלה מעולם, שלכן, הבירור שמצד בחינה זו הוא באופן דדחי' (ולא בדרך בירור), זמירות מלשון לזמר עריצים.

Dovid praised the Torah for the fact that it is *chukecha* (Your *chukim*) – Hashem's essential will which is completely beyond creation, and

therefore results in "*zemiros*" – the world is completely *bottul* to Torah. This corresponds to "foundations" and the fact that *Havayah* is **beyond** creation (past, present, and future as one). Since this level is beyond creation, it "**pushes away**" any aspect of the world (cutting off, "*l'zamer aritzim*") which conceals G-dliness rather than **refining** it to reveal G-dliness.

ומכיון שאמיתית ענין אחדות הוי' הוא שהאחדות היא גם מצד העולמות, לכן צ"ל ההמשכה דעדות ומשפטים דתורה (חכמות) שיהי גילוי אלקות בעולם. ועי"ז מתגלה העצם דתורה שלמעלה גם מחוקים, שם העצם.

Answer to Question Seven:

Even though Dovid was connected to Hashem's essence, he was connected to it as it exists **beyond** creation (past, present, and future as one). Therefore, he thought that revealing the aspect of *chukim* (G-dliness which is **beyond** creation) and completely nullifying the limited world was the ultimate goal.

However, the true unity of Hashem is expressed in the fact that the limited creation is able to recognize His true unity from within its **own perspective**. The unlimited aspect of *chukim* in Torah (*kabbalas ol*, "foundations") needs to be drawn into the aspects of *eidus* and *mishpatim* (understanding, "all [types of] wisdom") to reveal the essence of G-dliness from **creation's** perspective.

This reveals the **essence** of Torah (which corresponds to the essence of the name *Havayah*, Hashem's ultimate essence) which is beyond the level of *chukim*.

We now return to answer the questions on our original *possuk*, "*Havayah* is for me with my helpers, and I shall see [revenge] in my enemies":

Question One:

Why does Dovid HaMelech imply that Hashem is **"one** of his helpers" – and these other helpers are his "true helpers" who Hashem "partners with" – if a cornerstone of Jewish faith is that Hashem is the **only** one that we rely on?

וזהו הו' לי בעוזרי, עוזרי קאי על הניצוצות המתבררים, שהם העוזרים האמיתיים של האדם [וע"ד הידוע⁶³ בענין כי לא על הלחם לבדו יחי' האדם כי על כל מוצא פי הו' יחי' האדם⁶⁴, דע"י שהאדם מברר את הניצוצות שבדצ"ח, נמשך לו תוספת כח בעבודתו, שהניצוצות עוזרים ומסייעים לו], ופי' הו' לי בעוזרי הוא שהניצוצות המתבררים (עוזרי), הגם שענין הבירורים הוא מלמטה למעלה (ענין דעולם), ימשך בהם גילוי שם הו' שלמעלה מהשתלשלות. וחיבור ב' ענינים אלו הוא מהו' שם העצם.

The phrase "my helpers" refers to the sparks of G-dliness which are refined when a Jew serves Hashem within the limited creation. These sparks are the "true helpers" of a person (in contrast to the physical sustenance which he receives within creation).

This can be understood according to the way that Chassidus explains the *possuk*, "Not on bread alone does a man live, but rather a man lives on all that comes out of the mouth of Hashem." On a simple level, this means that a person depends on Hashem, and not on the physical world for his sustenance.

On a deeper level, this means that a person's true energy and sustenance comes from the part of the food which "comes out of the mouth of Hashem" – the "words" which Hashem used to create the food, which refers to the spark of G-dliness which brings it into being. When a person uses the food for serving Hashem, this releases the spark of G-dliness within it and gives him energy. Therefore, the true "helper" within the bread is not the bread itself, but rather the spark of G-dliness within it.

Even though these sparks are refined through our **limited** effort (which should not be able to reveal a level of G-dliness which is **beyond** creation), Dovid asked that "*Havayah* [a revelation of Hashem's ultimate essence] should be with me [when I refine the sparks of G-dliness within creation called] my helpers." The revelation of Hashem's ultimate essence (which includes both the unlimited **and** limited aspects of *Havayah*) enables the revelation of G-dliness which is **above** creation to be revealed through a person's limited efforts **within** creation.

Question Two:

Why does Dovid HaMelech request that he should see the **revenge** that will be taken on his enemies? Shouldn't he ask Hashem to transform his enemies into friends instead?

וזהו גם ואני אראה בשונאי, דגם אלו שהם שונאי דוד שהם שונאי הוי', אין צריך לדחותם לגמרי כ"א לברר הניצוצות שבהם, וע"י שמוציאים הניצוצות מהם הנה הרע שבהם מתבטל. וע"ז באים לראי' באלקות, אראה בשונאי, ראיית אלקות במוחש גם בעניני עולם.

Answer to Question Two:

The literal translation of this part of the *possuk* is, "and I will see in my enemies" – the word "revenge" is implied, but not written. On a deeper level, the *possuk* is read **without** adding the implied word "revenge."

As explained in the beginning of the *ma'amar*, "my [Dovid's] enemies" also refers to "the enemies of *Havayah*." On a spiritual level, the concept of the "enemies of *Havayah*" represents the aspect of the physical creation which (superficially) seems to contradict Hashem's unity. However, when "[the ultimate essence of] *Havayah* is with me [when I refine the sparks of G-dliness within creation known as] my helpers," then I am even able to refine the sparks of G-dliness within

"the enemies of *Havayah*," and the *kelipah* which concealed them will automatically be nullified. (This is because the life force within *kelipah* comes from its attachment to the spark of G-dliness within it. When the spark is separated from the *kelipah*, the *kelipah* ceases to exist.)

When this happens, then "I will **see** [the tangible revelation of G-dliness even within] my enemies [the physical world]."

The Rebbe connects this to the day of Yud Bais Tammuz, the *chag ha'geula* of the Frierdiker Rebbe and the day this *ma'amar* was said:

וכמו שהי' אצל בעל הגאולה, שגם המנגדים, אף שנשארו במציאותם, הוכרחו (ע"י הניצוצות שבהם) לעשות כפי הכוונה, והי' גילוי אלקות (דלמעלה מהטבע) במוחש (בטבע).

Even though the opponents of the Frierdiker Rebbe ("my enemies") continued to oppose him, they were **forced** (through the influence of the sparks of G-dliness within them) to follow Hashem's will (and free the Frierdiker Rebbe), tangibly revealing G-dliness which is **above** creation **within** creation.

The Rebbe concludes:

ועי"ז המשיך הכח לכל ההולכים באורחותיו להמשיך גילוי אלקות דלמעלה מהטבע בטבע, וזה נעשה הכנה קרובה שתושלם הכוונה דדירה לו ית' בתחתונים, שהתחתונים יהיו דירה לו ית', לו לעצמותו⁶⁵, בגאולה האמיתית והשלימה ע"י משיח צדקנו, בקרוב ממש.

Through the fact that this happened to the Frierdiker Rebbe, it brings this ability to all those who follow in his ways – the ability to bring unlimited G-dliness into the limited creation. And this is an appropriate preparation for the swift fulfillment of Hashem's ultimate goal for creation – a *dirah b'tachtonim*, the revelation of Hashem's essence within the physical world. This *dirah b'tachtonim*

accomplishes both opposites; it is a *dirah* (a home) for Hashem's ultimate **essence**, and it is a home within the *tachtonim* – the limited creation.

May this happen speedily in the true and complete redemption through Moshiach Tzidkeinu!

Footnotes from the Original Hebrew

(* יצא לאור בקונטרס חג הגאולה י"ב-י"ג תמוז - תשמ"ז, "לקראת חג הגאולה י"ב-י"ג תמוז . תמוז ערב חג הגאולה ה' תהא זו שנת משיח".

(1) תהלים קיח, ז.

(2) נדפס בסה"מ קונטרסים ח"א קעט, א ואילך. תרפ"ז ע' רא ואילך.

(3) ראה גם רד"ה זה בלקו"ת דרושים לשמ"ע (פח, ב).

(4) תהלים קלט, כא. וראה שבת קטז, א. תניא ס"פ לב.

(5) תהלים קד, לה. ברכות יו"ד, רע"א.

(6) ראה בהשיחה (ס"י) שנאמרה בההתוועדות בהמשך להמאמר (תורת מנחם - התוועדויות ח"כ ע' 114 ואילך).

(7) פרק ב. וראה שם רפ"ד.

(8) תהלים קיט, נד.

(9) ראה מצודת דוד עה"פ.

(10) ראה פרש"י ד"ה זמירות - סוטה לה, א. מצודת ציון עה"פ.

(11) ראה רמב"ן עה"פ ואתחנן ו, כ. וראה בארוכה ד"ה ויקם עדות ה'ש"ת פ"א-ב. ד"ה אם בחוקתי ה'ש"ת פ"ד (סה"מ ה'ש"ת ע' 51 ואילך. שם ס"ע 90 ואילך). ד"ה רבי אומר ה'תש"ב פ"ב (סה"מ ה'תש"ב ע' 115 ואילך). סה"מ אידיש ס"ע 45 ואילך. ובכ"מ.

(12) עירובין ק, ב.

(13) ראה תנחומא חוקת ג. שם ח. במדב"ר ר"פ חוקת. ועוד.

(14) ראה גם תרגום עה"פ: תושבחן הווי לי. ובאוה"ת להצ"צ עה"פ ס"ד (יהל אור ע' תסב): החכמה של הזמירות . . לעורר ההתפעלות . . וכמו"כ ענין השבחים למעלה הוא לעורר גילוי המדות.

(15) קו"א ד"ה דוד זמירות (קס, א ואילך).

(16) ראה קו"א שם. ד"ה הוי' לי בעוזרי תרפ"ז הנ"ל פ"ב ופ"ד.

(17) פרק ד.

(18) ראה שהש"ר פ"ב, יב (הובא בהמאמר שם, ובאוה"ת שם ס"ג - ס"ע תסא ואילך).

(19) גיטין ז, א. וראה תו"א מקץ לא, סע"ג שמביא מארז"ל זה לענין זמירות היו לי חוקין.

20) ראה ד"ה רבי אומר ה'תש"ב שם, דג' החלוקות דעדות חוקים ומשפטים "הן שתי חלוקות כוללות". ועפ"ז יומתק זה שבהמאמר (דתרפ"ז) מבואר רק ענין חוקים ומשפטים.

21) ראה שער האמונה פי"ג. עטרת ראש דרוש לעשי"ת נח, ב ואילך. המשך תרס"ו ע' סז. ובכ"מ.

22) ראה תקו"ז תיקון ל' (עד, א). הובא בתניא פ"ד. רפכ"ג. ועוד.

23) בתניא רפכ"ג, דזה שהמצוות נק' אברים הוא לפי שאברים הם לבוש להרצון. שבוה, כל המצוות (האברים) בשוה. אבל בפשטות צ"ל, דזה שהמצוות נק' אברים הוא גם מצד ענין הפרטי שבכל אבר - ראה לקו"ת בחוקותי מז, ב, דזה שהמצוות הם רמ"ח אברים הוא ע"ד "כח הראי' בעין וכח השמיעה באזן". וראה גם לקו"ת בלק עא, סע"ב ש"ע"י קיום המצוות. . ממשיכים האור בפרט להתלבש במצוה פרטית שהיא אבר א' מרמ"ח אברים דמלכא". ולהעיר גם מלקו"ת במדבר יג, סע"א "המצוות שהם אברין דמלכא עד"מ יש בהן התחלקות". ובקו"א (בתניא) ד"ה להבין מ"ש בפע"ח (קנה, ב): להמשיך האור למטה לרמ"ח אברין דז"א ומתחלקת ההמשכה לתרי"ג המשכות פרטיות לפי ערך המצוות.

24) ראה סהמ"צ להצ"צ מצות חמץ ומצה בתחילתה (כב, ב). דהטעמים שבגליא דתורה הם בהתאם להטעמים שבפנימיות התורה "כמו הלבוש לגוף, ויש עוד כמה פנים לפנים עד אין קץ ותכלית".

25) תניא רפמ"א. שעה"א ועט"ר שבהערה 21. המשך תרס"ו ע' נז. ובכ"מ.

26) כמבואר בהמאמר פ"ג. וראה בארוכה ד"ה ת"ר מצות נ"ח כו' ה'תשל"ח ס"ד (לעיל ח"ב ס"ע קסד ואילך). וש"נ.

27) שהרי גם המצוות דחוקים הם אברים פרטים מרמ"ח אברים דמלכא. ומה שהם חוקים - יש לומר, שלא נתפרש טעמם בנגלה דתורה.

28) פרק ג. וראה גם ד"ה ויקם עדות ה'ש"ת ספ"ב.

29) ראה קונטרס העבודה פ"ב.

30) תהלים עח, ה. ולהעיר*, שהקאפיטל תהלים דבעל הגאולה (שמתחיל ב"ב תמוז שנה זו (תשי"ז)) הוא מזמור עח.

31) דשנת ה'ש"ת (נדפס בסה"מ ה'ש"ת ע' 51 ואילך). וראה גם לקו"ת פקודי ד, א ואילך.

32) ר"ה כב, ב.

33) לקו"ת אמור לא, ב. ואתחנן ד, א. סהמ"צ להצ"צ מצות האמנת אלקות בתחילתה (מה, א). ובכ"מ.

34) איוב יט, כו.

35) ועד להתאמתות דראי' - מבשרי אחזה אלוקה, כמבואר בלקו"ת וסהמ"צ שם.

(36) סה"מ עת"ר ע' ב.

(* ע"פ המנהג לומר בכל יום הקאפיטל תהלים המתאים לשנות חייו (מכתב כ"ק מו"ח אדמו"ר, נדפס ב"קובץ מכתבים" שבסו"ס תהלים אהל יוסף יצחק (ע' 214). אגרות-קודש שלו ח"א ע' לא. ח"י ע' נג. וראה גם מאמרי אדה"ז הקצרים ע' שמא. סה"מ י"א ניסן ע' 1 ואילך). המו"ל.

(37) המשך תרס"ו ע' נת. סה"מ תרפ"ז ע' קעו ואילך. ד"ה תכלית חכמה תרפ"ט פ"ב ואילך (סה"מ קונטרסים ח"א כט, ב ואילך). ועוד.

(38) כמובן מהמשך הענינים בד"ה ויקם עדות ה'ש"ת הנ"ל. וכן הוא להדיא בהמשך תער"ב שבהערה הבאה.

(39) ראה המשך תער"ב ח"א פס"ז.

(40) תקו"ז בהקדמה (יז, א). וראה מאמרים שבהערה 37.

(41) ראה תניא פמ"א (נו, ב ואילך) ובארוכה בסה"מ תר"ס ע' קמט ואילך, שגם הרצון שמצד אהבה הטבעית "לדבקה בה' ולא ליפרד . . בשום אופן אפילו במסירות נפש ממש" הוא דוגמת הרצון "לרוות נפשו הצמאה", וענין הביטול הוא שכל רצונו הוא רצון הוי' - שיהי' גילוי אלקות בעולם.

(42) ראה תנחומא נשא טז. בחוקותי ג. ב"ר ספ"ג. במדב"ר פי"ג, ו. תניא רפל"ו.

(43) ראה גם סה"מ תרפ"ז ע' קפא ואילך המעלה בהעבודה דקב"ע גם על רעו"ד. ושם ס"ע קפב, "דמעלתן של ישראל כמו שהם בעצמותו ית' ויתעלה הוא שהן עבדים דוקא".

(44) המשך תרס"ו ע' תקכא.

(45) פרק ז.

(46) ראה סוטה לה, א. במדב"ר פ"ד, כ.

(47) ישע"י מה, יח.

(48) ואתחנן ו, ד.

(49) ראה זח"ב קסא, א. ח"ג רסד, א.

(50) ראה תו"א וארא נה, ב. סהמ"צ להצ"צ שרש מצות התפלה פי"ח.

(51) ראה סמ"ק, הובא בב"י או"ח סס"א (ד"ה כתב סמ"ק). שו"ע (ואדה"ז) או"ח סס"א ס"ו. לקו"ת

תזריע כג, ג. וראה ברכות יג, ב.

(52) שער היחוד והאמונה פ"ו.

ד"ה הוי' לי בעוזרי

- (53) זח"ג רנו, סע"ב. פרדס ש"א פ"ט. שער היחוד והאמונה רפ"ד.
- (54) זהר ופרדס שם. שער היחוד והאמונה פ"ז (פב, א).
- (55) כ"מ הל' עכו"ם פ"ב ה"ז. פרדס שי"ט. מו"נ ח"א פס"א ואילך. עיקרים מאמר ב פכ"ח.
- (56) שי"ט ספ"א.
- (57) ראה סה"מ תרס"ח ע' קצ. וראה גם המשך תרס"ו ע' תלא.
- (58) ראה לקו"ש ח"ג ע' 782. ועוד.
- (59) אגה"ק ס"כ (קל, ב).
- (60) ריש הל' יסודי התורה.
- (61) סדר הדורות ד"א תתכז. שה"ג להחיד"א מע' רמב"ם. וראה גם "פירוש" לרמב"ם שם.
- (62) סה"מ תרס"ח שם.
- (63) לקו"ת צו יג, ב (וראה שם ע' ג). ובכ"מ.
- (64) עקב ח, ג.
- (65) ראה אוה"ת שה"ש כרך ב ע' תרעט ואילך. סה"מ תרס"ב ע' שלה. תרע"ח ע' קצג.

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ב"ה

לע"נ

הרה"ח הרה"ת אי"א נו"נ עוסק בצ"צ

ר' דניאל יצחק ע"ה

בן יבלחט"א ר' אפרים שליט"א

מאסקאוויץ

שליח כ"ק אדמו"ר זי"ע

למדינת אילינוי

נלב"ע ב' אדר שני ה'תשע"ד

ת.נ.צ.ב.ה



DEDICATED IN MEMORY OF

RABBI DANIEL ז"ל MOSCOWITZ

LUBAVITCH CHABAD OF ILLINOIS

REGIONAL DIRECTOR



וְאֲנִי דָּנִיֵּאל נְהִייתִי... וְנִאְקוּם וְאֶעֱשֶׂה אֶת מְלַאכַת הַמֶּלֶךְ

AND I, DANIEL ... ROSE AND DID THE KING'S WORK

(DANIEL 8:27)